How DAOs Can Use Votermedia

 

Today I released a 7-page white paper How DAOs Can Use Votermedia – summary below:

 

Designers of future DAOs (Decentralized Autonomous Organizations) may find some useful ideas at votermedia.org/publications, especially in the paper Global Software Users’ Co-op.

A decentralized voter information system called votermedia, originally designed for corporate shareowners, has been developed and tested for several years in a large university student union – see Experiments in Voter Funded Media. Evolution of these ideas has generated several innovations, including:

• A continuous-time voting system for allocating flows of funding among teams who compete to serve the interests of a voting community – see pages 7-9 of Global Software Users’ Co-op.
• A design for liquid democracy – see Proxy Voting Brand Competition, proxydemocracy.org and page 2 of my 2010-09-29 comment letter to the SEC.

Any new DAO could adapt these ideas to create a competitive market for providing its token holders multiple benefits:

• voter information, analysis, insight, voting advice;
• software infrastructure, bug checking;
• contractors monitoring and critiquing each other;
• investment allocation, accounting, auditing;
• DAO governance oversight, critique, amendments.

Implementing these governance innovations in DAOs can stimulate similar reforms in conventional organizations, including corporations, co-ops and governments.

See white paper: How DAOs Can Use Votermedia

Introduction to DAOs (Distributed Autonomous Organizations)

To prepare for my next post “How DAOs Can Use Votermedia”, here is some background for those unfamiliar with Distributed Autonomous Organizations:

DAOs are a new design for an online organization, which requires little or no centralized controlling power (like a CEO, board of directors, or even a legal regulatory environment). Instead, DAOs are based on software code that distributes control widely among many participants, who may play roles similar to (but more powerful than) shareholders in a for-profit corporation or members in a co-op. Most of the software code is recorded in a blockchain, which also serves as a ledger of cryptocurrency transactions.

Existing corporations and co-ops, by contrast, tend to concentrate power centrally (e.g. in a board of directors), especially as they grow large. Boards may claim to be accountable to all those who can vote to elect them, but existing governance designs seem to let boards concentrate power in themselves through various techniques (explored throughout the votermedia project).

The first DAO to be created, known as “TheDAO”, raised an eye-popping $150 million worth of Ether (a Bitcoin competitor) from investors in its May 2016 initial offering. It was designed like a venture capital fund that would invest in projects approved by majority vote of investors. However, it attracted the attention of expert hackers who soon found a bug in TheDAO’s code, and siphoned off about $50 million on June 17.

Fortunately the code prevented the hacked funds from being traded during an interim period, which gave the Ether community enough time to design and execute a “hard fork” in their blockchain, reversing the hack’s transactions and refunding all investments in TheDAO back into Ether. So TheDAO no longer exists, but many observers and participants are anticipating and planning “new, improved” DAOs.

From my perspective working on governance reform, DAOs are an exciting innovation. They open a big door to experimenting with many possible governance reforms. In my next post I will reach out to share ideas with designers of new DAOs.

Background Reading:

• wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain_(database)
• 2016-04-14 zdnet.com/article/why-ripples-from-this-estonian-blockchain-experiment-may-be-felt-around-the-world
• wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin
• 2016-06-29 nytimes.com/2016/07/03/business/dealbook/bitcoin-china.html
• wikipedia.org/wiki/Decentralized_autonomous_organization
• 2016-08-24 History of the DAO and Lessons Learned

 

Why I’m voting WITHHOLD on Fission Uranium (FCU)

“Using the internet for shareowner proxy voting … will awaken the sleeping giant of corporate governance – individual investors.” My optimism was premature when I wrote that in 1999. But finally the giant has awakened and is starting to stir.

Retail shareowners of Fission Uranium Corp (FCU) have joined forces via internet media, including their Stockhouse.com discussion forum, to challenge the incumbent board’s control of the company. It’s significant that retail investors own a majority of Fission’s shares, in contrast to the institutional investor dominance typical of larger firms.

Citizens United: U.S. Supreme Court decision

Last month’s U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United case has given corporate management considerable latitude to use corporate funds in political campaigns. Many are concerned that corporate political spending often influences public policy in ways that harm the public interest. So the individual investor advocacy organization ShareOwners.org has launched a campaign to reduce the potentially harmful effects of corporate money on politics. ShareOwners.org is focusing on disclosure of political spending, and using investors’ voice to restrain management abuse of this power — details in the ShareOwners.org press release and this SocialFunds.com article.

I applaud the ShareOwners.org initiative, and would like to suggest an additional strategy. The voter funded media (VFM) system is designed to help us voters use our power in corporations (where we own shares) and democracies (where we are voting citizens) so as to serve our interests, which are generally close to the broad public interest. An important reason why corporate political spending can fool us into voting for politicians who do not serve the public interest, is that we lack well-funded media loyal to the public interest. Letting voters allocate public funds to competing media would fill this gap, thus undercutting the influence of campaigns that try to fool us.

Similarly, VFM applied to corporations would help us shareowners keep management accountable to our interests, e.g. ensuring that they do not spend our corporation’s funds on political campaigns that harm us. To see why management’s political interests diverge from ours, see pages 98-99 of “Democracy and Infomediaries” at votermedia.org/publications.

Thus I recommend supporting the spread of voter funded media implementations in democracies (e.g. votermedia.org/communities/82-ubc-ams) and corporations (e.g. Proxy Advisor proposals), as well as for investor education.

Giving talks at Stanford & Berkeley

I’ve recently scheduled to give these three talks:

Nov. 16 at Stanford Law School’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance, mainly on the paper “Proxy Voting Brand Competition”, my work on the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, and ProxyDemocracy.

Nov. 17 at U C Berkeley’s Institute of Governmental Studies, mainly on the paper “Global Voter Media Platform” and VoterMedia.org.

Dec. 10 at the 2009 British Columbia Pension Forum, mainly on the paper “Proxy Voting Brand Competition”, my work on the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, and ProxyDemocracy.

More info on the talks at votermedia.org/presentations. The papers are available at votermedia.org/publications.

Vote to allocate investor education budget

I write two blogs, and their topics overlap somewhat. (The other is VoterMedia Democracy Blog.) This post is an example of that overlap.

Both blogs relate to the website VoterMedia.org, which is a political reform project that focuses on the economics of information that flows to voters, in corporations and in democracies.

I propose that voters in each community (corporation, city, country, labor union etc) vote to allocate a budget among competing information providers. These would be something like proxy advisors for corporate shareowners, and political media & think tanks for democracies. For smaller voter communities like student unions, the advisor/info role would often be filled by bloggers.

I first proposed this for corporations in 1988, and published it in 1997 (and later) — see votermedia.org/publications. I submitted it as a shareowner proposal many times, some of which are listed at votermedia.org/proposals. Management of course opposed it, but I was disappointed in the lack of support from institutional investors.

So I expanded my scope to democracies, wrote some papers about how to apply the idea there, and sponsored several test implementations in the last few years, especially at the University of British Columbia’s student union and in Vancouver city politics. I explain the idea and test results in the paper Global Voter Media Platform, along with a plan for the website which we are now building. See also our FAQ page.

Thinking about the issues we are facing in the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, I found myself reacting to the problems of disclosure requirements, especially disclosure to retail investors, e.g. when buying mutual funds. It’s so hard to control the behavior of people who make money from investors. But a well-designed investor information/education system should be able to effectively empower individuals to make better investment decisions.

The economics of such an information system are similar to the economics of voter information systems. There’s a large shared public interest component of such a system, which private markets do not fulfill very well. But allocation and oversight of public funding is often inefficient and ineffective, so we end up with poor information systems. The voter funding allocation system I’ve proposed could be applied to investor education too.

So I recently added a page for that to our new website — see votermedia.org/communities/223-usa-investor-ed. For now, the whole website is in public test mode. There’s no funding yet. Anyone can vote, with or without a login. So far I’ve just told a few colleagues about this new page, so the votes are too heavily weighted toward Proxy Democracy (where I’m on the board). Feel free to vote and tell others, to balance this out! (Also see example pages for Vancouver and UBC.)